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MOSS ESTATE COMPANY (a Corporation), Respondent, 
v. BERTHA RIESE ADLER, as Executrix, etc., Ap-
pellant. 
[1] Quieting Title-Pleading-Fraud.-General rule that fraud 
must be specifically pleaded applies particularly to quiet title 
actions. 
[2] Id.-Pleading-ADswer.-In action to quiet title to a water 
well, defendant is not entitled to establish an equitable interest 
in well and water therefrom, based on violation of confidential 
and agency relationship between her and her adviser who is 
also plaintiff's secretary, under a general allegation of owner-
ship of claim in well and water. 
[8] Equity-Principles-Clean Hands.-Rule that whenever it is 
suggested that plaintiff is guilty of fraudulent or other im-
proper conduct with respect to his claim it is duty of court 
of equity to inquire into facts with respect thereto necessarily 
presupposes that facts indicating improper conduct on part 
of plaintiff are properly before court, since otherwise de-
fendant could evade rule that fraud must be specifically pleaded 
merely by offering to prove facts showing fraudulent conduct 
on part of plaintiff. 
[4] Pleading - Amendment - At Trial. - Although amendments 
should be liberally allowed so that all issues may be properly 
presented, the question whether filing of an amended pleading 
should be allowed at time of trial is ordinarily committed to 
sound discretion of trial court. «(lode Civ. Proc., § 473.) 
[5] ld. - Amendment - Of Answer.-Wbere defendant in quiet 
title action sought to file an amended answer alleging a new 
defense based on different facts on eve of trial more than a 
year after original answer was filed and more than two months 
after she had notice of date- set for trial, where she was aware 
of facts at time original answer was filed but gave no excuse 
for her delay, and where original answ~r gave no inkling of 
facts alleged in proposed amended answer and a continuance 
would have been required had leave to file been granted, it 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Quieting Title, § 32; Am.Jur., Quieting Title, 
§243. 
[4] See Cal.Jur., Pleading, § 133; Am.Jur., Pleading, § 296. 
(5] See Cal.Jur., Pleading, § 140; Am.Jur., Pleading, § 2BB et seq. 
:HeX. Dig. References: [1) Quieting Title, § 65; [2] Quieting 
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cannot be said on appeal that trial court abused its discretion 
in denying defendant leave to file her proposed amended 
answer. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern 
County. William L. Bradshaw, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action to quiet title to a water well. Judgment for plaintiff 
affirmed. 
L. W. Wrixon, Joseph Young, Kenneth H. Bates and 
Deadrich, Gill & Bates for Appellant. 
West, Vizzard, Howden & Baker and Gordon L. Howden 
for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant is the executrix of the estate 
of Theresa Riese, who owned a tract of land in Kern County 
adjoining a siIIlilar tract owned by plaintiff. For convenience 
we refer to d~endant as the owner of the Riese property. 
In 1946 plaintiff leased its land to Mesa Farms for 10 years 
commencing January 1, 1947. At about the same time de-
fendant leased her land to William Fisher, the secretary of 
plaintiff corporation, and pursuant to an understanding with 
defendant, he assigned his lease to Mesa Farms. Pursuant 
to the terms of the leases, the lessee drilled a well on plaintiff's 
land 50 feet from the boundary of defendant's land and con-
structed irrigation works on both properties. Water from the 
well is now used by the lessee for agricultural purposes on 
both plaintiff's and defendant's land. On December 4, 1950, 
plaintiff filed this action to quiet title to its land. It alleged 
that it was the owner of the land and that defendant claimed 
some interest therein. Defendant answered and alleged the 
existence of the facts set forth above with respect to the well 
and leases and claimed "a right and interest in the lands, well 
and subterranean waters underlying the lands of plaintiff 
... , together with such necessary easements as will enable 
defendant to receive from said well, as long as said well re-
mains in use, a fair and equitable share of the waters taken 
from said well, representing waters underlying defendant's 
hereinabove described land which adjoins the said lands of 
plaintiff." Defendant also filed a cross-complaint allegmg 
that plaintiff was withdrawing water from her land without 
her consent and sought damages therefor. At the trial de-
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drainage of water from her land as well as her claim that the 
lessee was using water from the well on land other than that 
of plaintiff and defendant. The trial court granted judgment 
for plaintiff quieting its title against defendant, and defendant 
has appealed. 
On April 16, 1952, 12 days before the date set for trial of 
the action, defendant filed a notice of motion for leave to file 
an amended answer. The motion was denied on April 22d. 
At the trial she renewed her motion for leave to file an 
amended answer and made an offer to prove the facts alleged 
therein. The motion was again denied and the court held that 
the offered evidence was inadmissible under the pleadings. 
On the basis of these rulings defendant seeks a reversal of the 
judgment. 
Tb4 facts alleged in the proposed amended answer, and 
which defendant offered to prove, may be summarized as 
follows: William Fisher, secretary of plaintiff, had for many 
years acted as defendant's business adviser and agent in her 
dealings witt. her property and was in a confidential relation. 
ship to her. At the time the leases were executed, Fisher 
knowingly and falsely represented to her that the lessee in· 
sisted on drilling the well on plaintiff's land rather than on 
defendant's land or on the boundary between the two tracts. 
He also falsely represented to her that the lessor on whose 
land the well was located would have to pay the lessee $10,000 
for the well and its equipment on termination of the lease. 
In fact the lessee would have prejerred to drill the well on 
defendant's land because of its higher elevation, but drilled 
it on plaintiff's land instead because plaintiff required it 
to do so. No payment will have to be made for the well on 
the termination of the leases. Neither plaintiff's nor de· 
fendant's land by itself has sufficient area to justify the 
drilling of a well. Thus, the lessee would not have leased one 
tract without the other and would not have drilled a well 
unless it could use the water on both tracts. Defendant would 
not have leased her land without requiring that the well be 
drilled on her property or on the boundary line, had Fisher 
not misrepresented the facts to her. Defendant is willing to 
bear her share of the expense of maintaining the well and 
claims an interest therein for the purpose of securing water 
for her land. 
It thus appears from the proposed amended answer that 
defendant is seeking to establish an equitable interest in the 
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confidential and agency relationships between her and Fisher. 
This violation was accomplished by means of fraudulent repre-
sentations, and ~nabled Fisher to secure for plaintiff the en-
tire benefit of the well to the exclusion of defendant. 
[1, 2] The first question presented is whether defendant 
was entitled to prove such an interest under a general allega-
tion of ownership of a claim in the well and water. This 
question was decided adversely to her in 8trong v. 8trong, 
22 Ca1.2d 540 [140 P.2d 386]. In that case the court said, 
"Defendant contends that the judgment quieting title in her 
should be affirmed on the ground that she was induced by her 
husband's false representations to sign the deed. Defendant 
did not plead fraud, however, although the general rule that 
fraud must he specifically pleaded [citations] applies particu-
larly to quiet title actions. [Citations.] Defendant, moreover, 
is not the legal owner, for title passed on execution of the deed. 
[Citations.] Any rights that she might have to the cancella-
tion of the deed or to the declaration of a constructive trust 
are entirely equitable [citations], and it is settled that such 
rights cannot be established in ail action to quiet title when 
the pleadings contain merely general allegations asserting de-
fendant's ownership and denying that of plaintiff. [Cita-
tions.]" (22 Cal.2d at 545-546; see, also, Munfrey v. Cleary, 
75 Cal.App.2d 779, 785 [171 P.2d 750] ; Botchford v. Alt, 71 
CaI.App.2d 340, 345 [162 P.2d 984]; Borneman v. 8ali-na,s 
Title Guar. Co., 66 Cal.App.2d 500. 503 [152 P.2d 649].) 
[3] Defendant contends, however, that it is the duty of 
a court of equity, whenever it is suggested that a plaintiff is 
guilty of fraudulent or otherwise improper conduct with 
respect to his claim, to inquire into the facts with respect 
thereto. (See DeGarmo v. Goldman, 19 Cal.2d 755, 764-765 
[123 P.2d 1]; Rosenfeld v. Zimmer, 116 Cal.App.2d 719, 
722 [254 P.2d 137] j Howe v. Brock, 86 Cal.App.2d 271, 276 
[194 P.2d 762].) This rule necessarily presupposes, however, 
that the facts indicating improper conduct on the part of the 
plaintiff are properly before the court. (See Aalwyn'8 Law 
Institute v. Martin, 173 Cal. 21, 26 [159 P. 158]; Munfrey 
v. Cleary, 75 Cal.App.2d 779, 784 [171 P.2d 750] ; Borneman 
v. 8alinas Title Gttar. Co., 66 Cal.App.2d 500, 503 [152 P.2d 
649]; Bank of America v. Goldstein, 25 Cal.App.2d 37, 46 
[76 P.2d 545] ; Hagar v. Home 8tores Inc., 85 Cal.App. 533, 
534-535 [259 P. 1007]; Portuguese American Bank v. 
8chultz,49 Cal.App. 508, 515 [193 P. 806].) Otherwise, a de-
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pleaded merely by offering to prove facts showing fraudulent 
conduct on the part of the plaintiff. In the present case 
there is nothing in the complaint, the answer, or the evidence 
introduced under the pleadings that indicates in any way that 
plaintiff or its agent was guilty of any fraudulent or improper 
conduct, and accordingly, the trial court was under no duty 
to inquire into facts outside of the scope of the pleadings. 
Defendant finally contends that the trial court abused its 
discretion in· denying her leave to file her proposed amended 
answer. Defendant filed her answer and cross-complaint on 
February 13, 1951, more than one year before the case was 
set for trial. At that time plaintiff stipulated that defendant 
might file an amended answer within 60 days should defend-
ant's consultation with an expert in water law indicate the 
desirability of an amendment. Plaintiff filed its answer to 
the cross-complaint on March 9, 1951, and in January, 1952, 
it notified defendant that the case was set for trial on April 
28, 1952. Defendant took no action until 12 days before 
the date set for trial, when she noticed her motion to file her 
proposed amended answer. Plaintiff's attorney filed an affi-
davit in opposition to defendant's motion and resisted her 
application for leave to file an amended answer on the follow-
ing grounds: The case had been at issue 13 months when the 
motion was made. Although defendant knew of the facts 
alleged in her proposed amended answer before plaintiff's 
complaint was filed, she offered no excuse for the delay in 
. pleading them. Defendant's attorney had discussed the cas~ 
with plaintiff's attorney two months after the original answer 
was filed, but at that time made no request to amend the 
answer. Since the proposed amended answer raised new issues 
of fact with respect to the alleged fraudulent representations. 
if leave to file were granted, the trial would have to be con-
tinued to allow plaintiff time to investigate the factual issues 
thus raised for the first time. Plaintiff contended that it was 
entitled to go to trial under the original pleacings as ~duled. 
[4] Although it is true. as defendant contends, that 
amendments should be liberally allowed so that all of the 
issues may be properly presented. the question whether the 
filing of an amended pleading should be allowed at the time 
of trial is ordinarily committed to the sound discretion of the 
trial court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473.) In the present case 
we are not confronted with an amendment designed to cure 
a technical defect in a pleading otherwise adequate to put 
the other party on notice of the true basis of the pleader's 
) 
586 Moss ESTATE CO. V. ADLER [41 C.2d 
ease. (See, Eatwcll v. Beck, ante, pp. 128, 135-136 [257 
P.2d 643] ; Burns v. Scooffy, 98 Cal. 271, 276 [33 P. 86]; 
Ohatfield v. Williams, 85 Cal. 518, 520·521 [24 P. 839]; 
Hopkins v. Hopkins, 116 Cal.App.2d 174, 180-185 [253 P.2d 
723] .) Defendant's original answer was apparently based 
on the theory that a landowner may have an interest in a well 
located on adjoining land if that well taps a pool underlying 
both properties. At the trial, however, defendant abandoned 
this theory (see City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 
Oal.2d 908, 925·926 [207 P.2d 17]), and sought instead to 
set up an entirely different defense. Although defendant 
offered no excuse for not seeking to file her proposed amended 
answer sooner, she contends that no delay in the trial would 
have been necessary. She bases this contention on the facts 
that she was fully prepared to prove the allegations of her 
proposed amended answer, and that Fisher was present in 
court and thus able to testify with respect to his part in the 
transaction. This contention assumes, however, the truth of 
her allegations. It may be conceded that if plaintiff had no 
defense to her claim, further preparation would have done it 
no good. If, on the other hand, defendant's proposed answer 
was not true, plaintiff needed time to investigate the facts 
and to secure evidence to support the testimony Fisher would 
have given to that effect. 
[5] The trial court was thus presented with a situation 
wherein defendant sought to file an amended answer alleging 
a new defense based on different facts on the eve of the trial 
more than a year after the original answer was filed and 
more than two months after she had notice of the date set for 
trial. Defendant was aware of the facts at the time the 
original answer was filed, but she gave no excuse for her delay. 
The original answer gave no inkling of the facts alleged in the 
proposed amended answer, and a continuance would have 
been required had leave to file been granted. Under these 
circumstances we cannot say that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying defendant leave to file her proposed 
amended answer. (Scholle v. Finnell, 167 Oal. 90, 102 [138 
P. 746]; Manka v. Union Fert't'lizer 00., 151 Oal. 581, 584 
[91 P. 393] ; Lewis & Queen v. S. Edmondson & 8ons, 113 
Oal.App.2d 705, 711 [248 P.2d 973] ; Associated Tel. 00. v. 
Greenman, 111 Cal.App.2d 193, 196 [244 P.2d 15] ; Anderson 
v. Perminter, 78 Cal.App.2d 378, 380 [177 P.2d 818] ; Davies 
v. Symmes, 49 Cal.App.2d 433, 440 [122 P.2d 102J; Bank of 
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McGushin v. Arnold, 21 Cal.App.2d 271, 274 [68 P.2d 733) ; 
Johnson v. Johnson, 134 Cal.App. 460, 461 [25 P.2d 538) ; Sul. 
livan v. Richardson, 119 Cal.App. 367, 370 [6 P.2d 567); 
Hesse v. Commercial Credit Co., 97 Cal.App. 600, 602 [275 
P. 970] ; Hagar v. Home Stores, Inc., 85 Cal.App. 533, 535 
[259 P. 1007] ; Portuguese American Bank v. Schultz, 49 Cal. . 
App. 508, 515 [193 P. 806] ; Allen v. Los Molinos Land Co., 
25 Cal.App. 206, 213 [143 P. 253].) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, 
J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
